Ukraine War, 1 December 2022

Good evening (and then: good morning) everybody!

It’s the first day of December this year: we’re over nine months into this war, and on the best way to the tenth — and then more…. one way or the other: plenty of things have happened the last week (‘or so’), and thus it’s time for an update.

AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

Having spent well over 200 ballistic- and cruise missiles, and ‘loitering ammunition’ the previous two weeks, during the last week of November the Putin/Surovikin-duo has significantly slowed down its offensive against Ukrainian infrastructure.

Yes, I know: a big air strike (supposedly involving up to 200 cruise missiles) was expected on 28 November — almost certainly because US and allied reconnaissance satellites have monitored corresponding activity at the Engels AB: the main base of the Russian Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers. Of course, this caused quite some concern not only in Kyiv, but in other places around Ukraine: after all, earlier strikes have caused massive damage, completely destroying at least a quarter of the Ukrainian power grid, and heavily damaging another half.

Certainly enough — and while I’m sure that many Ukrainians did not and (those still without electricity) do not have such a feeling — Ukrainian services reacted with remarkable vigour and skill: indeed, plenty of interested observers from the West were surprised to see how quickly were they reconstructing the power grid. So much so that many of ‘interested observers’ here in the West are meanwhile guessing that this had plenty of build-in redundancy left over from the Soviet times.

I do not know enough about that power grid to say, but have no doubts: reconstructing and powering up a power grid in the country the size of Ukraine…. doh….that’s no easy task. Actually, it’s an extremely complex task, taking lots of time. So much so, even if the grid would not be damaged, just the process of powering it up could easily take days. With all the damage, the things are only getting more complex — because, reportedly, the Russians were primarily targeting transformators and distribution centres. From their point of view, this was a relatively good idea: trying to hit nuclear power plants (NPPs) and thermal power plants (TPPs) is more complex and requiring precision they do not have, plus — in the case of NPPs — can easily have extremely negative repercussions (hint, hint…). Knocking out the lines and transformators is slightly easier — and causing enough damage, actually, because some of equipment is so big and complex that it takes weeks, if not months to replace.

Still, the Ukrainians are managing some remarkable repairs. My guess is that some of this ‘recovery capability’ is due to the fact that their services have meanwhile learned to (as reported the last 2–3 weeks) turn off exposed parts of the system as soon as there is an incoming attack — already before it’s hit. Moreover, since Ukrainian independence, a lot of the grid was modified so heavily that the Russians are experiencing major problems when attempting to use it (in newly-occupied parts of Ukraine). For example: they proved entirely unable to connect the nuclear power plants in Enerhodar to their grid.

Elsewhere…. On 28 November, between 15.00 and 17.00hrs local time, Ukrainians claimed a Russian Su-24 and Su-25 as shot down in the area between Bakhmut and Lysichansk. The two jets were probably involved in supporting attacks on Bilohorivka (the one on the Siverski Donets), and south of Bakhmut (see below for details).

On 29 November, the VKS is known to have run about 50 air strikes on ZSU positions in the Bakhmut area alone; Ukrainian Air Force hit back with 17 air strikes — primarily directed at the Russian artillery (notably: in that video, one can see a pair of Su-25s, escorted by a MiG-29).

RUBRIC: WE MUST DO SOMETHING

Of course, others are going to say, ‘that with repairs of the power grid is easily done, considering EU and NATO are in the process of delivering (reportedly) up to 120,000, if not 130,000 generators’, including several (six, if my memory serves me well) very massive ones.

Well, that damn sarcast in me cannot avoid the observation that this is once again ‘typical West’. See the rubric ‘We must do something’, and the classic ‘We’re taking care about Effects, only: never about Reasons’-politics.

Why that?

Delivering all the generators to Ukraine is great — and certainly appreciated. There is no doubt that, in short term, this is going to help a lot. BUT, it’s NOT PREVENTING additional Russian strikes: only bolstered air defences could do so.

Moreover, dear taxpayer: keep in mind that somebody has to pay for all these generators — which in turn also means that somebody is handsomely cashing from selling them to our governments so these could forward them to Ukraine…

RUBRIC: FIGHT WAR TO PROFIT, NOT TO WIN

The best of all is that, because the West continues ‘systematically’ undersupplying air defence weapons systems to Ukraine, there’s still no trace of an effort to protect all these new generators (not to talk about their users….!) once they are in the country. Sooner or later, the Russians are going to find the way to target one or the other, which is then going to mean that the West has to deliver yet more generators (after politicians spend taxpayer’s money to buy these, of course) — so that not only one or two, but multiple major corporations can earn extra profits. As usually.

….sounds like the essence of ‘fight to profit, not to win’, doesn’t it?

Yes, it does. That’s how Western warfighting works, folks — and that since at least the times of the Vietnam War…(what a surprise then, with one exception, the West never won a military victory ever since).

ENGLISH WALZER

How do they call that with ‘two steps forward, one back’? English Walzer, or so?

Well, the second step forward is that, along RUMINT, somebody has, finally, explained the retards in charge of the IRGC in Tehran, what kind of consequences are they ‘likely to face’ should they continue supplying loitering ammunition to Putin, not to talk about ballistic missiles. Correspondingly, Tehran should’ve stopped related deliveries: at least no new LPGMs were delivered, and certainly no Iranian ballistic missile came down in Ukraine. Yet.

Sounds great, doesn’t it? To people not knowing the top leaders of the IRGC — 10000% sure. To anybody knowing them at least a little bit better: sorry, no way. At least I cannot imagine any kind of a threat that would seriously impress the IRGC.

Additional RUMINT says that Putin is now buying weapons from China, big style, and that these are hauled to Russia, big style, too: in Antonov An-124 transports, numerous of which were tracked while flying something like an ‘air bridge’ from Moscow to different destinations in the PRC, the last week (‘or so’). AFAIK, there’s no visual confirmation, so cannot confirm or deny.

Finally, and ‘in the meantime’… the smoke surrounding Rishi Sunak’s solution for the war in Ukraine began clearing. The Sea Kings helicopters he…erm… the MOD in London has provided, are HU.Mk 5s: actually withdrawn from service with British Armed Forces years ago. But, hey: they’re looking so new and shiny on videos, and training for 10 Ukrainian crews is already underway….

Ah yes, and I’ve got to correct myself: it turned out that Croatia donated 14 old Mi-8 and Mi-8MTV helicopters to Ukraine. None of its (much more recent) 10 Mi-17s (provided by Russia about a dozen of years ago, as a pay-back for Moscow’s old debts).

(Talking about Croat Mi-8s: guess, Ukrainian technical personnel is going to recognise some of helicopters in question. After all, Croats bought them — clandestinely — from Ukraine, back in 1994–1995…)

BATTLE OF MORAST….erm… DONBASS

I’ve mentioned it, at least a week ago, and we’ve all got to see photos and videos from eastern Ukraine of the last week: the battlefield there is a big pound of mud. Everything is wet, 20+ centimetres deep in water. Correspondingly, everybody in the West was expecting the war on the ground to stop — and that through the winter. Which reminds me of that with Lamborghini-howitzers: perhaps somebody in the West would stop, but the Russians — and Ukrainians — wouldn’t. Perhaps it’s about the time for few people ‘out there’ to realise this is a serious war, and not just another pointless fire-fight somewhere in the Hindukush….?

Arguably, the situation down the frontline from Orlyanka to Kovalivka (roughly: ‘west of Svatove’), is largely static. The Russians did run a few local counterattacks on Novoselivske, for example, but that was nothing special.

Kremina… around 20–21 November, Ukrainians — which is the 81st Airborne, with the 110th Territorial Defence (TD) Brigade — have reached the outskirts of Kremina. Probably the southern outskirts. Then, there was a steady stream of reports about the Russians ‘unleashing’ the (re-built, for the third time) 144th Motor Rifle Division into counterattacks, but these being wrecked, one after the other. Finally, yesterday, word was that Ukrainians have entered Chervonopopivka and Holykove, north/north-west of Kremina. Regardless the outcome, Ukrainians are still not inside Kremina, and that’s unlikely to change before they extricate all of their troops and vehicles out of the sea of mud east of Dibrova.

The situation is much more serious further south: in the Bakhmut area. For much of November, Ukrainian (from north towards south) 10th Mountain, 93rd Mech, 58th Motor and 51st Mech, plus an assortment of smaller units, were holding out very well. The Wagner PMC would send another of its Zerg Rush assaults, have another company chopped to pieces, and withdraw. Unsurprisingly, well-substantiated reports appeared about the VSRF suffering a loss of up to 560 troops a day (for an average loss of 404 a day in November up to that point) — plus up to 27 pieces of heavy equipment (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces) a day. Think to recall that 26 November was quite a good day for the ZSU in the Bakhmut area, for example…

However, on or around 27–28 November, what the Russians are describing as ‘5,000 Musicians’ (Wagner PMC) began assaulting ZSU positions north-east and then south of Bakhmut. North-east of the town, they’re trying to drive a wedge between it and Soledar. Seems to have reached a cross-road between the two. More concerning were their assaults in between Opytne and Mayorsk, though. They hit the 30th Mech very hard, and with quantitatively superior force: Opytne and Andriivka held out, but Ukrainians have barely held out (if they’re still there) in the villages of Andrivka and Zelenopillya, and were forced to withdraw from Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka. Obviously, have lost a good stretch of the T0513 highway, too.

The ZSU is known to have rushed the 62nd Mech and few minor units to reinforce, together with several batteries equipped with M777 howitzers. Seem to have this stopped advance somewhere along the Naumykha River, or the adjacent, 15-metres wide canal, but this was a close call, with some of ZSU units having to retreat to avoid being surrounded; one was saved only thanks to a very effective local counterattack.

Overall, Ukrainians have lost some 50 square kilometres of terrain in the last four days, all south of Bakhmut. Of course, some are already seeing Bakhmut as ‘under direct threat’, ‘short of falling’, and the ‘battle swinging in favour of Russia’… well, to me, the town appears firmly in Ukrainian hands. It’s the situation further south that is critical. Indeed, even the social-media presences linked to the Wagner PMC are stressing: nope, they’re far away from taking Bakhmut. Just very proud of running their suicide mission..

That said, there’s no doubt that the ZSU will have to send yet more reinforcements to Bakhmut, then it seems that Putin, Prigozhin and Surovikin have sworn to get that town — regardless how many convicts from Russian prisons get killed in the process. So, if they are as insistent: why not doing them a favour?

BTW, on the lighter side: caught another report in the US press, in which a (quite shocked) author is complaining about how intensively are Ukrainians deploying their M777s (yes, meanwhile in the Bakhmut area, too), and that this is causing a situation where at least a third of howitzers delivered so far is undergoing repairs, or even re-building, at any time.

Of course, it’s ‘undertrained Ukrainian troops’ who are ‘constantly overusing’ their M777s — that are to blame…

Now imagine: these ‘undertrained’ Ukrainians…towing their US-made Lamborghini-howitzers through the mud… or, and worst of all: down the road at 90km/h+….or firing as many 155mm shells on one day as the US Army used to spend in an entire month (or two) of the Afghanistan war…. and packing and unpacking them all the time… Indeed: fighting a serious war against an enemy possessing about 9 times more artillery pieces….and whatever else… simply awful. Indeed: tragic… a tear came down my cheek at the thought of what are Ukrainians doing with these shiny pieces of US high-tech. How dare they? These barbarians obviously do not understand that M777s are made for travelling on smooth highways of northern Italy, and for fighting leisure COIN wars for 20+ years — at a tempo of 2–4 shells a day….!

Avdiivka… the Russians continued attacking forward Ukrainian positions in the Krasnohorivka area, north of Avdiivka. Although supported by superior artillery, and at least 30+ air strikes flown by the VKS on 28 November along, and once again, they have suffered quite some losses just while trying to cross the local section of the H20 highway. They have also continued their assaults from Opytne (as usually: there must be two places with the same name in at least two different sectors of this war at the same time), and Pisky along the M30 on Pervomaiske, south of Avdiivka. However, in grand total, the ZSU in this area is still holding quite well.

Further south, the Russians are running Zerg Rush attacks on Marinka, but 79th Airborne (supported by elements of the 1st Tank) is holding out. RUMINT has it the VSRF and Separatists there have received quite a number of reinforcements, but…. well, nobody can say how many. It seems, meanwhile everybody I happen to know has given up trying to find out what Russian units are deployed there: Putin is ‘pumping large numbers of reservists to selected sectors of the frontline’, that’s about all that can be assessed.

SOUTHERN ZAPORIZHZHYA

….after months of reading and reporting about fighting in this part of Ukraine, must admit: it’s unusual to realise that this is, de-facto, the ‘last sector’ of the frontline there is to mention. There’re no frontlines ‘west’ or ‘north of Kherson’ any more. Indeed, nothing ‘west/north-west of Dnipro’…

Anyway, two nights ago — and in the aftermath of reports about multiple M142 HIMARS-strikes on the Russian ammo- and supply depots in several towns of southern Zaporizhzhya — rumours began to appear about the Russians withdrawing from Mihailovka (should have abandoned the local police station and school, removed their flags and all the roadblocks) and from Polohy (‘Polog’). Then more rumours surfaced about Ukrainians advancing from around Huliapilske in general direction of Polohy (or, and more likely: around that town).

That said, what exactly is going on there: no idea. Have found no firm confirmation for anything of this: almost all of reporting about this area is ‘rumours’ — the amount (and quality) of which is meanwhile comparable with the amount of mud in south-eastern Ukraine. Guess, we’ll have to repeat the usual exercise for such cases: sit and wait for news.