Ukraine War, 12 December 2022: The Bakhmut Paper

Hello everybody!

The last two days, the Russian social media is ’brimming’ with ‘great news’. Plus, a group of Italian…erm… specialists in online psychoanalysis… is complaining I’m biased (in favour of Ukraine). Therefore, lets review what are the Russians reporting, the last few days…if for no other reason, then because it’s ‘slightly more’ than what they usually report.

My usual disclaimer in this place: you’re reading the following entirely at your own risk, and I’m not going to accept liability for any damage caused by logic, reason, facts, or (my very own) sarcasm.

GENERAL

The Russians are in the process of introducing a new all-terrain vehicles to service.

The VKS is said to have acknowledged the death of a Tu-22M-3 pilot in the Ukrainian drone-strike on Engels AB, on 4–5 December. That in addition to a Wagner-crew of a Su-24M shot down on 2 December in the Keshchevka area (while ‘striking an enemy armoured column’….ho-hum). Must be because (at least according to multiple Western ‘Experten’), the VKS collected such immense volumes of top-notch combat experience in Syria — while bombing defenceless civilians…

Meanwhile, Putin-fans are complaining: ‘Ukrainian artillery does whatever it wants’. Quote (auto-translation):

“Ukrainian artillery does whatever it wants. And the Russian “counter-battery struggle” is not a decree for her. We cannot oppose anything to the artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine regarding the security of Donetsk.
All talk about our superiority in artillery remains an empty phrase: we have neither ground reconnaissance weapons nor UAVs capable of instantly detecting enemy fire weapons and destroying them.
Do they know about this state of affairs? Do they report to the top about such a situation with intelligence equipment? We are prophesied great things, how can we go on the offensive with such support?
Where does this talk about lack of ammunition come from? Why are we again washing ourselves with the blood of civilians, Russians? Why is the population not being explained the path that led us to the bloodiest days of Donetsk in the entire war since 2014?
From Donetsk, no one groans, everyone just gnashes their teeth in hatred. But Donetsk is doing everything to take ours, all the men went to the front, the population does not panic and holds on. Will we pay tribute to Donetsk or not? Or will we be patient?
And as for the general situation, we must admit to ourselves and report to self-respecting responsible persons upstairs that even now, and all these 10 months, we do not have and did not have real means of conducting counter-battery combat, our artillery is blind. Come on, take courage and report.”

I actually do not like reminding anybody that ‘I told you so’, but: I am going to ‘enjoy’ something of that now. Because this is a direct result of something I ‘told you so’: that the Russian Orlan UAVs — the centrepiece upon which their entire reconnaissance-targeting-system is dependent - are useless in bad weather, especially when it’s freezing.

…while Igor Girkin and the ‘Grey Zone’ can’t stop announcing an Ukrainian offensive in the Hulaypole area, just like all the time since August.

Guess, this is a good example for ‘even a blind hen can find the corn’: if they do so long enough, ‘the history is going to prove them right’. Sooner or later (indeed: ‘sooner, rather than later’).

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Kupyansk…..according to a statement released by the Keystone Cops in Moscow yesterday, between 4 and 11 December 2022 alone, the VSRF ‘destroyed 2,595 Ukrainian militants’ — just in this area… The reader is going to excuse my doubts about the Russians ‘destroying’ what would be about half of a brigade ZSU, but there you are: have mentioned this and now you’re…ahem…’informed’ and have no reasons to complain any more.

Svatove….Yesterday, or early this morning, I’ve mentioned the rebuilt 1st GTA and its deployment in the area north of Svatove. ‘Right on time’, then on 10 December, the ANNA bragged with photos of BMPT Terminators deployed in that area. Guess, this should automatically mean, ‘game over’ — for all the Ukrainian troops along that part of the frontline.

Bakhmut…WarGonzo is claiming (sorry, lost the link, and can’t find it any more) that the ‘remnants’ of the II Battalion/93rd Mech were withdrawn from Soledar, and replaced by the 53rd Mech and the 112th TD Brigades — ‘due to catastrophic losses’.

Correspondingly, he wrote, the ZSU should now have ‘only’ the 53rd Mech and ‘remnants’ of the 65th Motor Rifle Brigades in Bakhmut. Foremost, from his point of view, this is something like ‘beginning of the end of Bakhmut’, or at least, ‘the beginning of the Ukrainian withdrawal’ from the town.

….if this is the true intelligence picture in Moscow, I think both the GenStab-U and the East OK are going to feel as happy as all the Russians now convinced this is the beginning of an Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut.

To make sure: yes, the 93rd was withdrawn from the town. As reported yesterday, Ukrainians actually rotated units: just like the 30th Mech, the 93rd was withdrawn from Bakhmut, and replaced by fresh troops. While the 30th Mech did suffer quite some, back in late November (for example: one of its platoons of 22 lost 3 POWs and had 17 others wounded), I have found no confirmation for any elements of the 93rd suffering anything like even ‘heavy’ losses, not to talk about ‘catastrophic’: if at all the latter is only valid for the Wagner units assaulting Soledar for three months (without any meaningful success).

Surely, the ZSU has lost some ground in the process: about 200 metres on the eastern side of the town, and some 100–150 metres in the south east. I do think that it abandoned few good defence positions in the process: why exactly was this decision taken, no idea but, I’m not sure if this is anything like ‘beginning of the end of Bakhmut’.

Foremost, mind that, together with the 92nd Mech, the 93rd is ‘famous’ for smashing about a dozen of Russian units. It began smashing them already in and east of Kharkiv, back in late February and early March; it continued smashing them (especially the 144th Motor Rifle Division) through April and May, it led the earliest Ukrainian counteroffensives of June and July, and it delivered the ‘stab in the back’ against the final Russian attempt to break-through to Sloviansk, back in August. The last two months, the 93rd was crucial in defending Soledar and northern side of Bakhmut. Now its simply the time to give its troops rest, enable them to reorganise and re-train, and thus go back to doing what they do the best: bushwacking the Russians at every opportunity.

THAT BAKHMUT PAPER

What is important about this all (and became a reason for this report today) is that most of such Russian claims seem to be based on this ‘captured piece of paper’, listing ZSU units deployed in the Bakhmut area, or arriving there as of the first week of December:

From what is discernible, and according to other Russians (but WarGonzo), except for the 93rd Mech, the ZSU also has the 58th (and its 13th Battalion), and the 72nd Mech (or at least its 48th Battalion) in positions north of the town. And then it goes on — where the Russians say that the alpha-numeric designations listed on that paper are codes for specific ZSU-units. Correspondingly:

• ‘A1976’ should stand for the 1322nd Artillery Ammunition Base.

No idea what would such a unit do this close to the frontline, but I’m open-minded and willing to learn…

• ‘NGU BROP’: this should be the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine. No news in this regards: that unit is on/off in this area for some four months now.
• Then, ‘+3030’: that should be the 25th Airborne Assault Brigade.
• ‘BTGR Hawk’ and ‘Berlingo’: no idea what are these two.
• ‘3027’ should stand for the 1st Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine.
• ‘A0536’ should stand for the 53rd Mech.
• …‘A3488 for the Aidar Battalion of the same brigade.
• ‘A1736’ should stand for the 57th Motor Brigade;
• ‘A4080’ for the 43rd Rifle Battalion;
• ‘A4247’ for the 243rd TD Battalion (114th TD Brigade);
• ’A0693’ for the 54th Mech Brigade’;
• ‘A4612’ for the 69th Rifle Battalion (93rd Mech);
• ‘A7188’ for the 95th TD Battalion (107th TD Brigade);
• ‘109 TRO’ for the 109th TD Brigade, and
• ’95 br’ for the 95th Airborne Assault Brigade.

Now, let’s run some ‘quick and dirty’ analysis of this….

Assuming this paper is authentic, and this is really the list of all the major Ukrainian units in the Bakhmut area (is perfectly possible — even likely), and if my calculation is correct, this would mean that the ZSU has a total of 9 brigades and 8 battalions in and around Bakhmut. If, say, all of these are at some 70–80% of their nominal strength, that’s a total of at least 30,000 troops; if they are fresh and at full nominal strength, perhaps as many as 50,000 troops.

…but no: the ZSU is in the process of abandoning the town, because WarGonzo is happy to report that Ukraine withdrew (literally) ‘one battalion from the 93rd Mech’…?

After 35+ years in this ‘business’, I cannot avoid the observation that when it comes to the Russian military intelligence and planning, there’s a strong predilection to mix wishful thinking with reality. It’s like what we call the ‘Spritzer’ here in Austria: some like it with 9/10ths of wine and 1/10th of water, others 50:50. But, the essence is always the same: kind of, ‘if we know the exact designation of an enemy unit, we consider the same for destroyed’ - although nothing of that kind has happened, or this is still planned (or just intended) for sometimes in the future.

I’m leaning towards the conclusion that here we have a similar case: because they are convinced they know what ZSU units are in and around Bakhmut, they’re already celebrating a victory, as if all these are destroyed.

While doing that, the Russians are not considering the following: if authentic, this is not only a nice indication for just what kind of a concentration of ZSU forces is there in Bakhmut, but also what do Putin and/or Surovikin & Co KG GesmbH AG SPA intend to ‘destroy’ — and that with help of their mix of, say, 30,000 poorly-trained ‘mobiks’ (mobilised reservists) and 5,000 of Wagner’s convicts…?

Blessed whoever considers this for possible… (in that sense: greetings to Italy!)

Kherson…Also on 10 December, the Russians have reported — and this is, supposedly, confirmed by official Ukrainian sources (they say: ‘Arestovych’) — an amphibious assault on the Big Potemkin Island, on the Dnipro, and that by ‘Arctic Infantry’ of the 80th Motor Rifle Brigade, ‘special forces’ of the 25th Regiment GRU, and ‘Leopards’ of the BARS. Correspondingyly, the landing took place opposite to the (still Russian-controlled) Belogrudovo, secured them the southern and eastern side of the island, and they’re meanwhile ‘running reconnaissance’ in northern direction.

No idea if this is truth, and wouldn’t know why would the VSRF become horny to have several of its few remaining ‘crack’ units forward-deployed and thus isolated on that piece of real estate. But, this might be indicative of Putin and/or Surovikin searching for ways to lessen the pressure of the Ukrainian forces upon their positions along the lower section of the Dnipro.

As usually when it comes to this sector of the frontline, we’ve got few other options but to wait and see what comes out of this.