Dec 6 — Day 286 — Cruise missiles and Heinkel 111s, and Hermann Goering and Sergey Surovikin

Hi FB!

I’ll depart from the normal format to highlight a couple of themes in particular. I’ll return to normal factoid transfer next time around.

As some of you have noticed, from time to time I’ve observed that living in wartime Ukraine sometimes feels a lot like living in a World War Two documentary.

So with that personal bias acknowledged and out in the open right off the bat, for the record, I have a sneaking suspicion that yesterday, December 5 2022, will go down in history as a turning point in the Russo-Ukraine War, and more specifically a turning point pretty similar to September 15 1940 in the Battle of Britain.

For which illustration and reference I lead this review off, inevitably, with a lovely image of a Supermarine Spitfire, one of the prettiest airplanes ever built.

The short version of this review is the Russians launched another wave of missiles at Ukraine yesterday and they pretty much fell on their face. As in: December 5 quite possibly was a decisive Ukrainian air defense victory.

For those of you unafraid of historical parallels involving Europe and the mid-20th century, read on. Many of you will recall that in the early days of World War Two, Nazi Germany had conquered mainland Europe and decided to use air bombing to destroy the Royal Air Force and facilitate German invasion of Britain. The plan failed. Basically, the problem was that Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering overestimated the German air force’s ability to beat down British air defenses.

On Sep 15 1940 British pilots (along with not a small number of Polish, Czech, French, Canadian (eh?) and other allied volunteer pilots) shot down 56 incoming Germany aircraft, among them many He-111 bombers. (Pictured)

Herr Goering and the German national leadership decided these losses were probably not sustainable because Germany wasn’t producing enough planes and pilots to make it up. That meant the German air force hadn’t a prayer in destroying the British air force, and THAT meant Germany had to think of a different way of winning World War Two, than invading Britain.

This led to the abandonment of Germany’s invasion plans for Britain and ultimately the Third Reich’s invasion of the Soviet Union, which as some of you may have read in your Twitter feeds, did not end well for Germany in general and Hermann Goering in particular.

I am going out on a limb a bit, but what happened on December 5 in the skies over Ukraine may well have been one of those decisive moments in a war. The Russians, after waiting about two and half weeks, launched another wave of missiles at Ukraine’s energy grid. Reports say about 70–80 cruise missiles were fired. As in the past, the primary targets appeared to be power grid substations and, in some cases, heating plants.

I think it’s appropriate to point out that the overall Russian commander in Ukraine, General Sergey Surovikin, in his last assignment commanded the Russian air force and, in his present job, is directly responsible for defeating Ukraine. He led the bombardment of Aleppo in Syria and by most accounts is a strong advocate of cruise missile attacks on civilians to achieve military goals.

So, although I would not necessarily go so far as to say Surovikin is exactly like Goering, the parallels are undeniably there: both commanded an air force, both attempted to use that air force to break the back of a civilian population, and both did those jobs in the service of what can only be described as a dictatorial, authoritarian, aggressive state dedicated to conducting war against its neighbors. Goering portrait attached to remind you what he looks like.

In contrast to past attacks, this time the Russians seemed to have made a very concerted effort to do what they could to get their missiles past the Ukrainian air defenses. They fired not a single salvo, but (at least) three separate waves. They launched from three different locations (Azov Sea, Caspian Sea, Rostov Oblast’). Missiles attacked targets from several directions. Some missiles were aimed in follow-up strikes, probably with the intent to take advantage of tired air defenses, and possibly to hit repair crews moving to fix damage. In Kharkiv region, next to the border, Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile units reported jammers inside Russia were attempting to shut down Ukrainian air defense radars. Some of them were very spiffy and new X-101 cruise missiles (Pictured)

The Kremlin, of course, said everything went great. Attached is video from state television of Kinzhal missiles heading north from somewhere in the Black Sea.

The hard evidence contradicts the Moscow narrative. In fact, this new and improved Russian attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, got shot to pieces. Those Kinzhal missiles? Basically, four out of five of them got shot down.

Every indication I see is, the Ukrainians were ready and waiting for the attack. Emblematic of this the attached video: a German Gephard anti-aircraft cannon blasting an incoming missile out of the sky. This is an effective but relatively short-range weapon, and the hard part is figuring out the right place to put it in a country the size of Germany and France put together. Clearly, at least this time, the Ukrainians guessed correctly where a Russian missile was coming.

If you watch the video closely, you can see the gunner unload on the falling missile shortly before it crashes. He’s already shot it down, but he unloads into the falling debris, just to make sure.

The best evidence of the Russian failure is the reality on the ground. After the Nov. 15 attacks, in which 85–90 missiles were fired, in rough terms, there was a huge nationwide blackout. Four out of five Ukrainian households, probably, lost electricity for two or three days. Hospitals and critical infrastructure still had power, but trust me, tens of millions of people suffered in the dark.

On December 5., only one city — Odessa — arguably was forced into a full black out, and power was being restored to some homes hours after the strike. Water and most heating was still off by morning of the 6th but by afternoon the water and heating was mostly on. The mayor said getting the power grid back online would take until nighttime at least. By morning on the 6th all rail service to and from Odessa was moving again, albeit sometimes trains were four hours late. This was impressive recovery considering “two major energy infrastructure objects” in Odessa were hit badly. Ukraine government image of Odessa firefighters, attached.

Partial blackouts, again in the context of the present war, were reported in Zhitomyr, Zaporizhia and Vinnitisia. The rest of the national power grid, basically, was not harmed or so slightly damaged that the effect on civilian life wasn’t really noticed. Mobile phone communications stayed up, nationwide. That’s a very big difference from three weeks ago.

Why the change? Again, I’m speculating, but on December 5 it seems to me the war reached a point where Ukrainian air defenses for the first time, clearly, outmatched the Russian missiles to such a degree, that the basic Russian goal — plunge millions of Ukrainians into the dark for extended periods of time — was a demonstrable failure. The Kremlin sent a very expensive salvo of missiles (some of these cruise missiles cost $10 million a pop, and total cost of yesterday’s salvo was probably a half billion dollars deducted from the Russian government books) at Ukraine, with the specific goal of repeating the November blackouts or, from the Russian point of view, inflicting even more pain on civilians than the last time.

In fact, it was a lot less. People died and hundreds of thousands were left without heating and power, but, by the standards of this war, yesterday’s strikes by Russia on Ukraine were an incontestible flop.

Given factors like Ukrainian air defense capacity is likely only to increase, because NATO seems very enthusiastic about its stuff shooting down Russian missiles aimed at Ukrainian civilians; and that Russia needs sanctioned microchips and even made-in-Ukraine engines to make more of these missiles, it’s hard to see how that outmatch will not move more in Ukraine’s favor over time.

To me, that result and implied future dynamic is a pretty close parallel with September 15 and the Battle of Britain. The air attacker got to the point where air bombardment no longer was, in the face of existing defenses, sustainable.

It’s pretty clear nine month of war have taught the Ukrainians a thing or two. As the missiles were coming in yesterday, to me anywyay, the Ukrainian civil defense network and Ukrainian social media seemed be functioning a lot like a pretty well-drilled American aircraft carrier group air battle control center.

From the comfort of a warm room, on my smart phone, I could find out when the missiles were fired, what route they were taking, what cities they were homing in on, how many of them there were, when and generally where air defenses were engaging them, and fairly quickly initial claimed kills.

Authorities reported, pretty much real time, where power was lost, when switch offs were due to damage and when it was because of a need to prevent an overload of the grid somewhere else. Pretty quickly video of shoot downs surfaced, via social media. It was fairly clear missiles were getting shot down all sorts of ways: by Soviet-era anti-aircraft missiles, by interceptor aircraft, by imported NATO missiles, and by gunners on the ground.

Less than four hours after the attacks, the power authority of the city of Kyiv announced that electricity deliveries are back to standard service. The air force released stats: 70 missiles fired, 60 shot down. Over Kyiv it was 10 fired and 9 shot down.

This is pretty much the opposite of a country knocked to its knees by overwhelming bombardment. This is a whole lot more like a fit featherweight in a ring with an aging heavyweight who still can land a heavy punch or two, but every step and swing he takes, he becomes more and more tired and more likely just to stay in his corner, as his opponent keeps jabbing away.

The question of course is still open as to whether this Ukrainian success is sustainable over the long term. Probably but it’s not for sure. The Russians could get lucky, or maybe they’ll figure out a way to cancel out the Ukrainian air defense radars, or maybe there are less anti-aircraft missiles in NATO than cruise missiles in Russia (doubt it), or maybe the Russians will try firing several dozen missiles at a very few targets, and catch the Ukrainian air defenses spread out.

But against all those maybes there is is the record: this time, the Ukrainians obviously saw what was coming, their intelligence was good enough to predict the strike 48–72 hours ahead of time, with every strike they become better-practiced at repairing and recovering, and with every day that passes, more NATO nation-financed generators, substation components, anti-aircraft missiles etc. enter the country. How is Russia going to find more microchips (blocked by sanctions) and more engines (mostly manufactured in Ukraine) to make more missiles? Can they ever mount a properly crippling missile strike, and even more, what are the chances of their being able to repeat it?

Sauce for the Goose

Symbolically, December 5 also marked a turning point in this sense: the Ukrainians conducted a pair of very long-range strikes into Russia, aimed directly at destroying Russia’s ability to hit Ukraine and its power grid.

Specifically, very early in the morning, at the Engels airfield outside Saratov, and the airfield Dyaglievo outside Ryazan, respectively 500 and 650 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, deep inside Russia, there were explosions. Bombers used in strikes against Ukraine, or more exactly used to carry cruise missiles to a point over the Caspian Sea or Rostov Oblast’, where the missiles are launched at Ukraine, are permanently stationed at these bases. These include the Tu-160 (kind of like the US B-1), the Tu-95 (the propeller Bear bomber from all the Cold War movies) and the Backfire bomber.

Important point: These bombers are all not just battlefield weapons but, like the cruise missiles, technically nuclear weapons carriers.

From the point of view of national security, yes these bombers are useful tools with which to bash the helpless Ukrainians, but much more, they are pieces of the Russian nuclear triad. In other words, the bombers’ main job is to exist as a potential nuclear threat, so the Americans or the Chinese don’t get the idea they use their own nuclear weapons against Russia without Russian retaliation.

The explosions apparently damaged a pair of bombers at Engels and at least two bombers at Dyaglievo, where three air force personnel died and six were injured, apparently ground crew. It seems possible, but it isn’t confirmed, that the blasts reduced the number of bombers available to the Russians for cruise missile launches later in the day. The Russians say damage was insignificant but unfortunately for them there are satellite overflights. Video attached of the Engels air base before and after the Ukrainian drone attack. Image attached showing probable BDA from the Ryazan attack.

What is crystal clear, however, is that Russia’s nuclear deterrent force is vulnerable to attack. What is worse, the attack seems to have been carried out — reports are speculative here — by obsolete Cold War-era cruise missiles the Ukrainians modified or re-engineered and fired at the Russians. Some early reports said maybe it was Ukrainian spies and secret agents, but the general opinion today seems to be no, the Ukrainians once again figured out a way to field a weapon that shoots a lot further than anything they’re supposed to have in inventory.

There are two terrible implications for the Kremlin following from that: first, that Russia’s strategic nuclear bombers, whose protection should from a national security point of view be sacrosanct, are actually vulnerable to pretty primitive weapons fired by a country about one-fifth the size of Russia, so what does that say about Russia’s military? But second, and even worse, if the Ukrainians with their limitations can take out Russian strategic bombers parked on an air base deep inside Russia, what could the Americans or Chinese do if they chose?

These questions are not just military and strategic in the Russian context, because in Russia, historically, the military stays out of politics until such time as the political leaders prove themselves to be absolutely incompetent as regards national security.

As to what comes next, on Dec. 6 the governor of Russia’s Kursk Oblast’ reported a drone hit a fuel storage facility at a local air force base and set off a serious fire. Video attached. Reportedly, this is the fourth time this war the Ukrainians have hit the facility.

Likewise on Dec. 6, in Russia’s Bryansk Oblast’, 80 kilometers from the Ukrainian border and maybe 120 from Ukraine-controlled territory, a drone missed a “military strategic reserve” fuel storage facility by three meters and blew up. The reservoirs were according to official Russian sources empty and damage was insignificant, but there still was smoke and flame, so images attached so you can decide for yourself. According to the Ukrainian internet 10–15,000 tons of military-grade fuel went up in flames. Video and image of that attached as well.

Inside Ukrainian territory, a series of explosions hit RF-controlled Melitpol last night, and also overnight, either Ukrainian artillery or HIMARS destroyed the Makeevka power substation servicing Donetsk. According to RF media the Ukrainians also tried to hit Belbek airfield in Crimea but “all the drones were shot down”.

Here’s my final point. Anyone thinking the Ukrainians will limit the shooting to just the front line and the territory they control should take note. (West European diplomats, I’m looking at you!)

The evidence is abundant that the moment the Ukrainians have a target in RF-controlled territory and a weapon to hit it, they shoot. As the war goes on it’s reasonable to expect the Ukrainians will develop longer-ranged and more powerful weapons. Ukraine has too many friends to face many limits to what components its engineers might get, to build something to hit Russia. OK, not nukes. But not much short of that, is what I predict. The longer the war goes on, the more often, and the more deeply, Ukraine will strike Russian targets. Good or bad, escalatory or foundation for peace, depend on it.

Finally, if you’ve read this far I’ve attached a video of some enterprising UAF soldiers who took the direct approach when faced with the task of evacuating an armored vehicle without any wheels.